Wine securityflaw: Protect against root

[David D. Hagood]

P. Christeas wrote:

>
> Write a segment of code that will abort wine, if it is run as root 
> (that is,
> just before wine starts anything). This piece of code should only be
> explicitly disabled in the 'configure' script. That way, only a 

I slightly disagree - I think the thing to do would be to have wine not 
run if UID == 0, UNLESS the commandline parameter --i-know-i-am-root is 
set, AND THEN pop up a dialog box that requires confirmation before 
continuing.

I would ALSO suggest that wine check the execute bit on the application 
being run - the recent incident with Klez running under Wine would not 
have happened (I think) if wine would not run that which is not marked 
with the -X bit (unless, again, a command line parameter is supplied, 
and a warning dialog is confirmed).

Since I know of no mail client for Linux that would set the X bit on an 
attachment, this would help protect users from themselves, while 
allowing those that need to be able to take the risks to do so.

And as for making "/" available as a Wine drive - how about creating a 
tool that would allow you to add or remove drive mappings at run time? 
So that if I find that I really do need /usr/foo/bar/baz available to 
Wine, I can run a program that tells wineserver to add that as drive Q: 
for now.