wineboot: Start items in StartUp folder on boot, includes security measures.

Misha Koshelev mk144210 at bcm.tmc.edu
Mon Feb 12 09:35:14 CST 2007


On Sun, 2007-02-11 at 23:49 -0600, John Smith wrote:
> What prevents malicious programs from writing this registry key on
> their own?
> 
> On 2/11/07, Chris Robinson <chris.kcat at gmail.com> wrote:
>         On Sunday 11 February 2007 06:49:58 pm richardvoigt at gmail.com
>         wrote:
>         > This sounds almost perfect.
>         
>         What would stop the program from adding the registry key
>         itself when placing
>         the item in the startup folder, or wherever else?
>         
>         > I think the counterpoint raised by James 
>         > Hawkins would be adequately addressed by adding a winecfg
>         option as
>         > follows:
>         
>         Sounds like it's just asking if it should ask.
>         
>         I'm not really sure what you could do as a user that a program
>         couldn't just 
>         override and do itself. Besides, users might not know whether
>         what's being
>         installed into an auto-start key/folder is necessary, deny it
>         for "safety
>         concerns", and have a broken installation.
>         
I think the bigger security issue to be made is that until wine default
behavior is not to set up the user's home directory in a writeable way
as the Z: drive there is really no way to store any settings in any
user-writable file without having malware being able to change if it
wanted to and was written specifically for wine (please correct me if I
am wrong). So I believe that, given this state, securing Wine from
malware written for Windows (which most is) and not specifically for
Wine is the best we can do.

Misha
> 



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