[Bug 25537] Wine allows access to / regardless configured ~/.wine/dosdevices

[wine-bugs at winehq.org]

http://bugs.winehq.org/show_bug.cgi?id=25537

--- Comment #3 from Artem S. Tashkinov <t.artem at mailcity.com> 2010-12-16 15:13:45 CST ---
(In reply to comment #2)
> There has never been any such security measure.

Pardon me, Julliard, but Wine _used to_ allow access to filesystems via
configured dosdevices and Z: was the only way for Wine applications to access
root fs.

Right now Wine exports "/" right on the desktop, thus negating the ability of
denying Windows applications access to /.

If it wasn't a security measure then I'm fine with it.

However I'm eager to get any substitute of what was once available.

(In reply to comment #1)

> (In reply to comment #0)
> > Probably since 1.3.8 or 1.3.9 any Windows application can open
> > (read/write/list/erase) any files in / (root) regardless user defined disk
> > devices (under ~/.wine/dosdevices).
> 
> I can't reproduce this behavior for normal Win32 file accesses with a clean
> Wine prefix after running winetricks sandbox, which removes the z: symlink and
> a few others.

Yes, I'm sorry. Even though / link on the desktop exists Wine doesn't allow to
read files from /. OK. However the fact that Windows application can even list
files under / is still a security weakness.

> 
> > It's a huge security issue, because in the past you could erase z: -> /
> > symbolic link and safely run any software (including malware).
> 
> Removing the z: symlink provides only illusory security benefits, as
> http://wiki.winehq.org/FAQ#head-3cb8f054b33a63be30f98a1b6225d74e305a0459
> discusses.
> 
> > This security measure has been removed without any explanations how to harden
> > your Wine PREFIX.

Wine wiki states that:

> Consider removing the default Wine Z: drive, which maps to the unix root 
> directory. This is only a weak defense, but it might help against some 
> attacks.

However I don't see any explanation as to why it's a weak defense. It's a
perfect defense, because unless wine server allows hijacking its own code via
direct memory access, no Wine application can leave the limits of predefined
desdevices.

OK, it seems like everyone disagrees with my arguments, so let's abandon this
feature.

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