Wine being targeted for adware

[Eduardo Menezes]

Well, Windows doesn't have multiple bottles (prefixes), each one with it's
own "windows" directory and registry. This is something "wine specific".
Managing prefixes is something "wine specific".
Just thought it is a nice feature to protect the rest of the system (your
home folder, for example) from some nasty application.
I do it by hand on some of my bottles (I separate bottles for each
application type and some of then I isolate from some parts of my
filesystem).
Just to be completely clear, by prefix and bottle I mean the same thing: the
~/.wine for example.
Best regards,

2009/1/15 Austin English <austinenglish at gmail.com>

> On Wed, Jan 14, 2009 at 7:23 PM, Eduardo Menezes
> <companheiro.vermelho at gmail.com> wrote:
> > I think a "isolate prefix" option in winecfg (or even winetricks) would
> be
> > very useful.
> > Undoing symlinks and editing the registry to take out the reference to
> the
> > root is boring (and I'm not sure only doing this is entirely safe) and
> this
> > kind of option would make it possible to run untrusted software without
> > worrying.
> > I even ran some malwares in isolated wine prefixes and used diff to see
> what
> > it did. Learned a lot from this.
> > Anyway, a "nice to have" feature.
> >
> > Best wishes and thanks for this amazing software,
> >
> > 2009/1/14 <wine-devel-request at winehq.org>
> >>
> >> Date: Wed, 14 Jan 2009 15:07:06 -0500
> >> From: Nicholas LaRoche <nlaroche at vt.edu>
> >> Subject: Re: Wine being targeted for adware
> >> To: Stefan D?singer <stefan at codeweavers.com>
> >> Cc: wine-devel at winehq.org
> >> Message-ID: <496E45EA.9060603 at vt.edu>
> >> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252; format=flowed
> >>
> >> Stefan D?singer wrote:
> >> >> As long as the facilities exist for keeping an entire wine bottle
> >> >> isolated from other bottles (and ~/) I don't see this being a major
> >> >> issue.
> >> > They don't.
> >> >
> >> > Even if you don't have a drive link pointing out of a bottle, a
> Windows
> >> > app
> >> > running in Wine can still call Linux syscalls(int 0x80). This is
> >> > possible/needed because Windows apps run as a regular Linux process
> that
> >> > links in Linux libraries which perform linux syscalls.
> >> >
> >> > So any Windows malware can break out of the Wine "sandbox"(which isn't
> a
> >> > sandbox really) by simply using linux syscalls.
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >
> >>
> >> On more recent distros (FC9/10) SELinux is enabled by default. Rolling a
> >> policy specifically for an untrusted bottle would severely limit the
> >> damage it could do. It could restrict all unnecessary read/write/execute
> >> access outside of the ~/.wine folder for wineserver and the program.
> >>
> >> I see your point though, since none of the aforementioned security
> >> precautions are commonplace or specifically targeted to wine.
> >>
> >
> > --
> > Eduardo
> > "Toda Revolução é IMPOSSÍVEL até que se torne INEVITÁVEL!!!" (Leon
> Trotsky)
> >
> >
> >
> >
>
> Windows doesn't provide this, why would wine?
>
> P.S., please bottom post on wine mailing lists.
>
> --
> -Austin
>



-- 
Eduardo
"Toda Revolução é IMPOSSÍVEL até que se torne INEVITÁVEL!!!" (Leon Trotsky)
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