Adding binfmt configuration to official Wine packages

[Bruno Jesus]

On Mon, Aug 22, 2016 at 1:08 PM, Jens Reyer <jre.winesim at gmail.com> wrote:
> On 22.08.2016 17:52, Bruno Jesus wrote:
>> On Mon, Aug 22, 2016 at 11:57 AM, Rosanne DiMesio <dimesio at earthlink.net> wrote:
>>> On Mon, 22 Aug 2016 15:28:39 +0200
>>> Jens Reyer <jre.winesim at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> What are the security implications? Won't this make it easier for malware to execute without being Wine-aware, or am I just being paranoid?
>>>>
>>>> We don't enable binfmt in Debian for exactly this reason (see
>>>> https://bugs.debian.org/819255). So I'd also be interested in other
>>>> opinions.
>>
>> Hi, I don't understand the security implications yet. If I download a
>> malware and run it like ./malware.exe or wine malware.exe what is the
>> difference?
>
> Whether you can accidentally do it manually?
> And if something else is able to start the exe?

Sorry, I really still don't understand what is the problem. You mean I
can accidentally type and run ./malware.exe for example using tab key
completion? That is the problem?

>> What is a real example
>> of a malware that benefits from this?
>
> Having that would indeed help, I'm not really sure about this myself.

I'm not asking for a real case virus name that would do it =)
I'm asking more like a general idea of what is the problem. If
malware.exe is already running it does not need binfmt support to run
another exe programs. If a linux sh has a hidden malware.exe I'm
pretty sure the hackers behind it will be smart enough to find the
correct way (./malware or wine malware) to run it.